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April 1, 2010
PUT WARNING BELLS ON WORLD FINANCE
Dr. Leif Rosenberger
Economic Adviser to General David H. Petraeus
U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND
If a tropical storm begins to gather hurricane-level strength off the coast of Florida,
FEMA warns us. If a ballistic missile is launched somewhere in the Middle East, shared
early-warning systems immediately alert affected nations while that missile is still
airborne. If a global economic crisis is lurking around a corner . . . nothing happens.
Instead of a triggered warning that allows for avoiding catastrophic consequences, the
crisis simply hits, taking national economies and countless individuals’ livelihoods with
it.
If the recent global financial crisis has taught us anything, it is that we need an
international financial Early Warning System (EWS) that can alert policymakers to
pending financial crises. In large part, the failure of our global financial institutions to
sound alarm bells well before economic collapse is the result of a flawed mind-set. In
their recently published book, Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff aptly refer to this
as the “this time is different syndrome.” Failing to give credence to the commonalities
of financial crises, economists and institutions of this mind-set instead conclude that we
cannot predict crises because a different, exceptional factor is in play each time. That
has left the International Monetary Fund and other organizations reacting to, rather
than trying to avert, crises.
In contrast, many economists and institutions have been able to predict and warn of
recent economic crises. Those of us at the U.S. Pacific Command in 2007, for example,
published a rather alarmist Asia Pacific Economic Update 2007 (Vols. 1 and 2). Our
alarm flowed from our use of what Reinhart and Rogoff term a “signals approach.” We
looked at numerous financial crises in the past 2 decades and saw disturbing early signs
of financial vulnerability common to all of them. Most importantly, we saw many of
these same financial risks threatening an overborrowed U.S. economy.
The same Early Warning System that we recommended in our APEU 2007 is even
more urgently needed now. Fortunately, the IMF has taken a step in the right direction
by conducting early warning exercises. But a much greater shift toward a signals
approach and toward a more comprehensive EWS is needed.
First, a financial EWS would monitor economic indicators that history reveals to be
precursors of economic collapse. Some of the most important indicators have been

overvalued foreign exchange rates and high current account deficits. In early 1994, for
example, the Mexican economy exhibited numerous warnings signs of financial
vulnerability, including a 30 to 40 percent overvalued currency, an alarming current
account deficit of 8 percent of GDP, and a rigid currency regime. This resulted in a run
on the Mexican peso, soaring foreign debt as the peso collapsed, and a costly financial
bailout. Thailand’s economy followed a similar story line in 2006-07, and the U.S.
financial crisis of 2008 was similarly preceded by a large and unsustainable U.S. current
account deficit.
Second, an EWS would take into account extenuating economic circumstances and
political factors that affect financial risk. Qatar’s large public borrowing requirements,
for instance, would be considered a dangerous economic indicator if we did not also
factor in the Qatari government’s investment in doubling the production and export of
liquid natural gas. Likewise, an understanding of political factors inside the United
Kingdom—most importantly, the high unemployment that made the United Kingdom’s
attempt to raise interest rates unsustainable—could have shed early light on the
impending Black Wednesday of September 16, 1992.
By accounting for all these indicators and factors, an EWS would identify a coherent
story line of rising financial vulnerability, where appropriate. Each economy’s
circumstance is different, but there are commonalities that allow us to be more effective
in predicting crises. By communicating simple but comprehensive story lines to
policymakers, an EWS would do more than simply ring alarm bells. Economies
generally crash in the same fashion as dominos fall. By identifying key factors and
decision points along the way as economic trends unfold, an EWS would provide
guidance—allowing policymakers to change the alignment of dominos, as it were, and
avert financial crises.
We have the historical knowledge needed to implement a financial EWS—most
logically at the IMF. But we need economists who know their financial history and who
are committed to a “signals approach” rather than economists who keep saying “this
time is different.” Nothing short of a wholesale culture change in our global financial
institutions is required, one that recognizes that the urgency of the times demands early
warning of financial crises—and that we are capable of providing it.
*****
The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily
reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of
Defense, or the U.S. Government.
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